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USING EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO IMPOSE 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Quan B. Nghiem* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The stated purpose of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is to "restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."1 When violations are found pursuant to a citizen 
suit, federal courts have the authority to order parties to come into 
compliance, to impose civil penalties, and to order injunctive relief.2 
The courts, however, have asserted that federal law requires any civil 
penalties imposed to be deposited into the United States Treasury.3 
As a consequence, the stated purpose of the CWA often goes un-
fulfilled because the monetary payments assessed against liable par-
ties go towards replenishing the United States Treasury instead of 
rectifying local environmental interests specifically affected by viola-
tions. 
Because the effect of this policy offends the purpose of the CWA 
and the public's notions of equity, plaintiffs have sought methods to 
direct some of the economic benefits gained from CWA enforcement 
actions towards the environment affected by the specific violations. 
One primary mechanism which citizens have employed is a supple-
mental environmental project (SEP).4 SEPs are defined commonly as 
* Topics Editor, Articles Editor, 1996--1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. 
133 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
233 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). 
3 See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987). 
4 See LISA JORGENSON & JEFFREY J. KIMMEL, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CON-
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voluntary acts performed by alleged polluters in exchange for a re-
duction in monetary penalties which would probably be assessed if 
the complaint were to be adjudicated.5 In the past, these voluntary 
activities have assumed many forms, including restoration projects 
and environmental studies in the regions affected by the particular 
environmental violations.6 
The benefits derived from the use of SEPs, however, have not been 
gained easily. The evolution of SEPs has been marked historically by 
executive resistance and legislative disinterest in support of their 
expansion, at least insofar as the CWA is concerned.7 In addition, 
when citizens have turned to courts to determine the legitimacy of 
these projects, most have indicated that SEPs are permissible as long 
as they are established as part of a settlement.8 
The full potential of SEPs remains untapped. Thus far, the creation 
of SEPs has been limited to consent decrees which arise from envi-
ronmental violations.9 However, the justifications for SEPs do not 
FRONTING THE CORPORATION (A BNA Special Report), 113-62 (1988). [hereinafter JORGENSON 
& KIMMEL]. 
5 Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental 
Projects Policy, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35613, 35613-14 (May 8, 1995) [hereinafter 
1995 SEP Policy]. 
6 See, e.g., General Electric Settles Lawsuit Over Alleged Saugus River Dumping, 24 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1207 (Oct. 29, 1993) (describing settlement of Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research 
Group v. General Elec., No. 87-1274-H (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 1993), which required $825,000 
payment to non-profit organization for purpose of funding conservation projects and $100,000 
to National Park Service and maintenance of historic sites); Settlement Reached in Water Act 
Citizen Suit Over Unlawful Discharge into Arkansas River, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1200 (Aug. 
14,1992) (describing settlement of Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert Corp., No. 91-2203 (W.D. 
Ark. Aug. 12, 1992), ordering $30,000 penalty paid to Treasury and $245,000 paid to wetlands 
acquisition and study projects on Arkansas River); ICI Americas, Inc. Agrees to Pay Million 
to Settle Charges Against Massachusetts Plant, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 434 (May 29, 1992) 
(describing settlement of Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. ICI Americas Inc., 
No. 89-1334-H (D. Mass. May 19, 1992), wherein $100,000 was paid into Treasury and $600,000 
diverted to local environmental projects to preserve and restore Taunton River watershed). 
7 See infra Section II.B-C. 
8 See infra Section IILA. 
9 See, e.g., Settlement of Clean Water Act Calls for $1.25 Million in Payments, Penalty, 25 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1830 (Jan. 27, 1995) (describing settlement of Tennessee Envtl. Council v. 
Dana Corp., No. 1:92---D074 (D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 1995), requiring defendant to undertake program 
to reduce toxicity of effluent, to pay $125,000 civil penalty, and to donate $1.125 million dollars 
to local non-profit corporation for purpose of protecting watersheds); Company Agrees to $10 
Million Penalty to Settle Citizen Suit Alleging Violations, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2353 (Jan. 15, 
1993) (discussing settlement of Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Witco Chern. Corp., 
Nos. 89-3146, C-359--83 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 1993), describing consent decree requiring payment of 
$10 million dollars to help fund various environmental mitigation projects, including medical 
center and water pollution abatement projects); Exxon to Spend $2.8 Million to Reduce Waste 
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change simply because environmental violations are settled rather 
than resolved through litigation. The environmental damage sustained 
by a particular region is the same regardless of when a SEP is re-
quested during the trial process. It is therefore clear that environ-
mental mitigation projects serve an important function even after a 
statutory violation has been found. Unfortunately, because civil pen-
alties frequently follow the finding of liability, courts have ruled that 
they are prohibited from using defendants' payments for the purpose 
of funding SEPs.lO 
Because the legislative disinterest towards SEPs does not appear 
to be changing, private citizens should consider appealing to the courts' 
equitable discretion. Judicial discretion may provide an alternate ba-
sis for courts to impose SEPs, even in instances where violations have 
been found. Although this power has been recognized by some courts, 
it has yet to be employed.ll Indeed, even the United States Supreme 
Court arguably recognizes the courts' authority to establish SEPs as 
appropriate remedies for CWA violations.12 While the Court has not 
addressed the issue of tailoring the remedy directly, the Court's in-
terpretation of equitable discretion in the context of the CWA lends 
credence to the position articulated above because it recognizes that 
courts may wield their broad judicial power to give effect to Congres-
sional statutory goalS.13 Hopefully, in future years, private plaintiffs 
will adopt this reasoning and obtain success in their claims through 
the use of this power; until Congress acknowledges the current 
deficiency of the CWA by establishing the judicial right to order 
SEPs, environmental plaintiffs should encourage such activism from 
the judiciary. 
Water Generated at N.J. Facility, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 883 (Sept. 7, 1990) (discussing settle-
ment in Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., No. 89-2284 (D.N.J. July 
7, 1990), which provided for two mitigation projects designed to supplement existing treatment 
center); see also Laurie Droughton, Comment, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bar-
gain fCYr the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789, 806-09 (1995) (noting citizen suit 
settlements providing for SEPs under various statutes, including CWA). 
10 See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 
F.2d 64, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1990), cm. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Atlantic States Legal Found., 
Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 743, 754 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
11 See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 82; Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
780 F. Supp. 95,101...(12 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. Ind. 1991). 
12 See infra Section IV.A-C. 
13 See infra Section IV.A-C. 
564 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:561 
Section II of this Comment describes the nature of SEPs and traces 
their historical development. The discussion includes an examina-
tion of the SEP policy which the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has issued, and summarizes various arguments that govern-
ment officials have raised against SEPs. This section is followed by a 
brief review of the judicial treatment of SEPs in Section III. This 
discussion notes that while the majority of courts have limited the 
creation of SEPs to settlements, a few courts have interpreted the 
CW Ns language broadly to grant courts the authority to approve 
SEPs after violations have been established. Section IV then turns 
towards an analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of judicial 
discretion under the CWA. Although the Court has yet to address the 
issue of court-ordered SEPs, its decisions are helpful in assessing how 
the Court's statutory interpretation of the CWA comports with the 
proposal of using equity to impose SEPs. Finally, in light of the 
preceding sections, Section V offers the argument that courts possess 
the authority to impose SEPs as part of a remedy under the CWA. 
The opinions imply that federal courts have determined that the CWA 
preserves a court's full equitable discretion in tailoring the remedy. 
The bounds surrounding this authority, however, should be constructed 
to avoid potential overreaching by judges and unfairness towards 
defendants. Courts can ensure sagacious application of their power by 
incorporating the experience of EPA to assist them in fulfilling the 
CW Ns central purposes. 
II. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF SEPs UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 
A. SE Ps Defined 
EPA defines SEPs as "environmentally beneficial projects which a 
defendant/respondent agrees to undertake in settlement of an en-
forcement action, but which the defendant/respondent is not other-
wise legally required to perform."14 This definition is set forth in EP Ns 
interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy 
(1995 SEP Policy), which is a guidance document designed to assist 
federal agencies in reviewing proposed environmental projects.I5 The 
14 See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 5, at 35613-14. 
15 See generally id. Because EPA felt that the policy should go into effect immediately, this 
most recent incarnation of the 1995 SEP Policy has been regarded as an "interim" policy rather 
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1995 SEP Policy describes a five-step process by which projects are 
qualified and implemented as SEPS.16 A proposed project must first 
meet the basic definition of a SEP.H Next, the project must satisfy 
certain legal guidelines. IS The project must then fit into one of the 
prescribed categories for acceptable SEPS.19 The last two steps of the 
process describe how calculated penalties will be mitigated by the 
acceptance of SEPs, and address implementation issues such as over-
sight, enforceability, and approval procedures.2o 
As an initial matter, any project proposal must meet the 1995 SEP 
Policy definition of a SEP, which identifies three central characteristics: 
the project must benefit the environment through reduction, improve-
ment, or protection of public health or the environment; EPA must be 
able to contribute to the creation of the project, one which cannot 
already be in existence; and the project must go beyond what federal, 
state, or local law would otherwise demand of the alleged polluter.21 
In addition, proposals must fulfill numerous legal guidelines, the most 
important of which being that the SEP maintain an appropriate nexus 
between the violation and the proposed project.22 
The heart of the 1995 SEP Policy, however, is the section which 
describes the seven categories of acceptable projects: public health, 
pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restoration, 
assessments and auditing, environmental compliance promotion, and 
emergency planning and preparedness projects.ZJ While this list grants 
corporations extensive flexibility in designing projects, EPA particu-
larly emphasizes proposals which promote pollution prevention.24 The 
than a proposed policy. See LeslieJ. Kaschak, Supplemental Environmental Projects: Evolution 
of a Policy, 2 ENVTL. L. 465, 465--66 (1996). 
16 See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 5, at 35613. 
17 See id. at 35614. 
IBId. 
19 See id. at 35614-16. 
20 See id. at 35616-17. 
21 See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 5, at 35614. 
22 Id. SEPs are likely to have an adequate nexus if the primary impact of the project is at the 
site, or within the ''immediate geographic area" where the alleged violation occurred; EPA notes 
that projects also are likely to have a sufficient nexus even if the proposal addresses different 
pollutants in a different medium. See id. The other legal guidelines require projects to fulfill a 
statutory objective of the law violated, prohibit any federal agency from controlling SEP funds, 
mandate that the terms and scope of SEPs be stipulated by a signed agreement, and disallow 
SEPs from assuming duties which EPA itself is required by law to perform. See id. at 35614. 
23 See id. at 35614-16. 
24 See id. at 35616-17. EPA explicitly encourages agencies to mitigate penalties by the degree 
to which SEPs incorporate certain favored factors such as pollution prevention initiatives. See 
id. at 35616-17. The emphasis on such projects has produced notable increase in SEPs in these 
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policy also lists projects which the Agency has deemed to be unac-
ceptable SEPs, including general education or public awareness pro-
jects, contributions to environmental university research, and pro-
jects which serve charitable non-environmental purposes.25 
Because of the flexibility they afford, SEPs offer advantages to 
both the beneficiaries as well as the parties who volunteer to perform 
them. Obviously, the primary beneficiaries gain from SEPs because 
proceeds imposed for violations are used directly to fund local or 
regional environmental activities rather than to support the general 
accounts of the federal treasury.26 However, corporations also have 
incentives for accepting SEPs because these projects often can trans-
late into sound business decisions.27 Most importantly, SEPs offer 
corporations an opportunity to avoid the potentially substantial costs 
and risks associated with protracted litigation. In addition, businesses 
may be motivated by the goodwill which they stand to gain from 
consumers and government enforcement officials who appreciate sin-
cere, albeit coerced, efforts to improve environmental conditions.28 
SEPs also provide certain corporations with opportunities to re-evaluate 
and improve upon inefficiencies in production processes.29 As a result, 
businesses that elect to perform SEPs often can improve competitive 
efficiency by lowering future compliance costs while simultaneously 
fulfilling their legal obligations.30 Finally, some parties simply may 
derive greater satisfaction from having their money directed towards 
some tangible, environmentally beneficially purpose instead of having 
the same funds deposited into a general federal poots! 
areas; in fiscal year 1992, pollution prevention or reduction projects comprised approximately 
45% of the EPA enforcement effort results. See Margaret Rosegay & Mehran Massih, Environ-
ment, Health and Safety Voluntary Programs, ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATE 1993, at 619, 643 
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook 1993). 
25 See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 5, at 35616. 
26 See Mitchel S. Jofuku, Note, Consent Judgments in Environmental Lawsuits: More Than 
You Thought?, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 921, 928 (1991). 
27 See Mark J. Zimmermann, Working with EPA's Revised Policy on Supplemental Environ-
mental Projects, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIGATION STRATEGY 1,4 (June 1995). 
28 See id. 
29 See Barnett Lawrence, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A New Approach for EPA 
Enforcement, Envtl. L. Rep., April 1996, available in WL, Environmental law, Envtl. L. Rep.; 
Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 4. 
30 See Lawrence, supra note 29; Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 4. 
31 See Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 4. 
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B. A Brief History of SEPs 
During the earlier years of environmental enforcement, govern-
ment agencies bore the greatest burden for enforcing environmental 
statutes.32 Although citizen suit provisions provided the option to 
attack polluters directly,33 private citizen environmentalists generally 
preferred to concentrate their efforts on compelling regulatory agen-
cies to execute their duties when they perceived that agency failure 
had occurred.34 Despite the efforts of citizen activists, however, the 
force of environmental enforcement began to deteriorate towards the 
end of the 1970's.35 Between 1977 and 1979, for example, the number 
of enforcement actions initiated by EPA under the Clean Water Act 
fell by fifty-one percent.36 This trend continued, reaching its nadir in 
1982, when enforcement dropped to a level equaling roughly twenty-
seven percent of its 1977 leve1.37 During this period, Congress also 
reduced the EPA's personnel by over twenty-five percent.38 
Funding cutbacks, coupled with the perception of administrative 
reluctance to pursue environmental violations, motivated citizens to 
assume more direct roles against polluters.39 This shift produced a 
32 See JEFFREY MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION 
CONTROL LAWS 10 (1987); Stephen Fotis, Comment, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act 
and The Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1985) (noting scarcity of citizen suit 
action against polluters during the 1970's). 
33 The CWA provides, in part: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a 
civil action on his own behalf-(l) against any person ... who is alleged to be in 
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order 
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, 
or (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator 
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the 
Administrator. 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). 
34 See MILLER, supra note 32, at 11; Fotis, supra note 32, at 127 n.lO (citing Natural Resource 
Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (suit seeking to force EPA to list lead as a 
pollutant); Natural Resource Defense Council v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (suit seeking 
to force EPA to promulgate effluent standards for toxic pollutants mandated by the CWA); 
Natural Resource Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (suit seeking to compel 
EPA to make effluent guidelines available to public». 
35 See William Andreen, Beyond Words Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for 
Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 204--05 
(1987). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See Fotis, supra note 32, at 129-30. 
568 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:561 
substantial increase in citizen efforts, particularly under the Clean 
Water Act.40 These lawsuits frequently led to settlements which in-
cluded provisions for SEPs.4i 
The gradual increase in citizen suits did not escape the attention of 
the federal government. Government forces grew increasingly appre-
hensive about the growing tendency to include SEPs in citizen suit 
settlements.42 One member of Congress expressed concern that SEPs 
would subject the public to "abusive, collusive, or inadequate" private 
settlements struck between parties.43 Interestingly, during this time 
in the 1980's, no party objected to EPA's periodic use of SEPs in its 
own enforcement actions.44 This apparent lack of substantial resis-
tance to EPA's use of SEPs may have reflected a greater confidence 
in the Agency's ability to forge equitable and effective negotiations. 
Alternatively, the government may have viewed such activities as 
belonging within the agency's sphere of delegated authority and there-
fore simply granted wide deference.45 
The Department of Justice (DOJ), which mounted the greatest 
challenge against widespread acceptance of SEPs, raised several ob-
jections.46 In particular, DOJ claimed that the use of SEPs would 
violate the federal government's appropriations process by unlawfully 
diverting civil penalties due to the Treasury towards private citi-
40 See MILLER, supra note 32, at 12. 
41 See JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 4, at 113-62. 
42 See David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expendi-
tures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 ENVTL. 
L. 175, 190 n.89 (1991) (citing JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 4 (noting that over 50 out of 
nearly 900 cases analyzed in a 1988 survey of citizen suits contained consent decrees providing 
for SEPs)). 
43 See id. at 193 n.106 (quoting 131 CONGo REC. S8097 (daily ed. June 13, 1985) (statement of 
Sen. Chafee)). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10350 
(November 1986) (defendant required to build water pollution control system at cost of $8 to 9 
million dollars, and pay civil penalties of $1 million and $50,000 to state of Arizona); United States 
v. City of Parma, Ohio, 50 Fed. Reg. 5329, 5329 (1985) (defendant city required to install catalytic 
converters on city vehicles, conduct inspections of city vehicles, educate city employees about 
auto tampering, and pay civil penalty of $3000); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 50 
Fed. Reg. 37293, 37293 (1985) (proposed consent decree amendment required defendant to 
complete seven environmentally beneficial projects). 
45 See Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) 
(establishing that court must defer to agency's statutory construction unless arbitrary and 
capricious). 
46 See Hearing on H.R. 3411 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation 
and the Environment and the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1987) (statement of Raymond Ludwizewski, 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter DOJ Statement]. 
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zens.47 It also argued that SEPs undermined the important function 
of deterrence because the substantial influence guilty parties main-
tain in designing and performing the project allows them to exert too 
much control over the extent of their punishment.48 Further, the 
Agency feared that permitting polluters to maintain control of "vol-
untary" projects would allow them to reap the public relations benefits 
of being perceived as benevolent sponsors of environmental improve-
ment projects.49 DOJ expressed the additional concern that frequent 
use of SEPs would make it more difficult to preserve consistency and 
predictability in enforcement decisions for similar violations. 50 The 
Justice Department predicted that granting courts the authority to 
approve widespread use of SEPs might conflict with decisions arrived 
at through EPA's technical expertise.51 Finally, DOJ was concerned 
that EPA would not be able to monitor SEPs effectively to ensure 
that they were being performed properly.52 
These concerns did not go unheeded in the 1987 Clean Water Act 
amendments, which were designed in part to curb the proliferation of 
citizen suits, and by effect, the growth of SEPs.53 Congress amended 
§ 1365(c)(3) of the CWA to require that proposed consent decrees be 
left open for a forty-five day review period in order to allow the 
United States Attorney General and EPA sufficient time to ensure 
that the proposal adequately met the goals of the statute.54 Even after 
the approval of the CWA amendments, DOJ continued to object regu-
larly to the use of SEPs.55 Most frequently, the objections were based 
on assertions that a strong nexus was lacking, that the violator's 
payments were due to the Treasury, or, notwithstanding the second 
argument, that violators were required to pay a substantial penalty 
in addition to performing an SEP.56 Some of these issues were clarified 
subsequently in the courts.57 
Despite the congressional attention devoted to this issue, the court 
decisions in the following years reflected uncertainty and a lack of 
47 See id. at 61. 
4B See id. 
49 See id. at 61-S2. 
50 See id. at 61. 
51 See DOJ Statement, supra note 46, at 62. 
52 See id. at 21-22. 
53 See Mann, supra note 42, at 192. 
54 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (1994). 
55 See Mann, supra note 42, at 196-200. 
56 See id. 
57 See infra Section III. 
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uniformity towards SEPs. For example, although the present and 
prior forms of the 1995 SEP Policy have required that SEPs only 
supplement, not displace, civil penalties, some courts ignored this 
limitation entirely in the past.58 In addition, the ambiguity surround-
ing SEPs also created difficulties for courts attempting to determine 
an adequate nexus between a proposed project and the underlying 
violation. One court, for example, declined to follow the nexus restric-
tions provided in the settlement policy which served as the precursor 
to the current 1995 SEP Policy.59 The court entered a settlement 
which allowed payments to be made to a state organization for gen-
eral, unspecified educational purposes.60 By contrast, another court 
refused to enter a consent decree because the parties had not pro-
vided a sufficient nexus between the SEP and the area affected by 
the CWA violation, as ordered by EPA policy.61 The court concluded 
that the Agency's policy deserved great deference because it fur-
thered the policies of the CWA and because EPA's statutory interpre-
tation was entitled to considerable weight.62 Indeed, another court 
refused to even consider EPA's policy bec3:use EPA was not a party 
to the consent decree.63 
Recognizing the confusion surrounding the issue, EPA subsequently 
issued its first policy statement which was devoted exclusively to 
SEPs (1991 SEP Policy).64 The central requirements of the 1991 SEP 
Policy were similar to those contained in the current 1995 SEP Policy: 
acceptable projects needed an adequate nexus, they had to fit into an 
acceptable category, and a civil penalty was required.65 The release of 
this policy document spurred an increase in SEPs, and prompted 
58 See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Port Townsend Paper Corp., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20532,20532 (W.D. Wash. May 2,1988) (consent decree which required defendant to pay $137,000 
to Nature Conservancy and plaintiff's attorney fees contained no payment to the government). 
59 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Interstate Paper Corp., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1135, 1136 (W.D. Ga. 1988). 
60 See id. 
6l See Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431, 437 (M.D. 
Pa.1989). 
62 See id. 
63 See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Simco Leather Corp., 755 F. Supp. 59, 61 
(N.D.N.Y. 1991) (implying that EPA settlement policy would not apply to cases where govern-
ment was not a party). 
64 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN EPA SETTLEMENTS, Environmental Protection Agency, Feb. 
12, 1991, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, GUIDOC File. [hereinafter 1991 SEP POL-
ICY]. 
65 See id. 
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Representative John Dingell to request that the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) evaluate whether EPA had the legal authority to enter 
SEPs.66 The resulting 1991 GAO report determined that EPA lacked 
the authority to establish these projects under Clean Air Act mobile 
source pollution enforcement actions, and furthermore, that the use 
of SEPs would violate the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, which requires 
monies received by federal agents to be deposited into the United 
States Treasury.67 EPA responded to GAO's report by asserting its 
right to include such settlements in its enforcement actions.68 GAO 
issued a subsequent report in 1993 which in essence reiterated its first 
report; EPA did not respond formally to this second opinion.69 The 
objections raised by Representative Dingell and GAO, however, un-
doubtedly affected the revisions which were incorporated into the 
1995 SEP Policy.70 
C. The Current EPA Stance on SEPs 
Notwithstanding the objections raised by GAO, EPA currently 
uses SEPs in a variety of environmental cases that are resolved 
through settlement.71 In 1993, EPA estimated that up to one in every 
ten EPA enforcement actions employed SEPs.72 A few statutes, such 
66 See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. 
67 See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. GAO's inquiry encompassed 
settlement agreements which related to public awareness and other projects performed in 
exchange for mitigated penalties resulting from violations of automobile air pollution standards. 
See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. 
68 See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. 
69 See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. 
70 See Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 29. The 1995 SEP Policy amended 
the 1991 version by removing "public awareness" projects as an explicit category for acceptable 
SEPs, and by adding legal guidelines to assist agents in determining whether the establishment 
of a project fell within EPA's delegated authority. See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 5, at 
35613-16; cf 1991 SEP POLICY, supra note 64. 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Khubari Enter., Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 51490, 51490 (1995) (consent 
decree entered by CWA defendants included $25,000 penalty for illegal discharges, restoration 
of 2.6 acres of despoiled land, and a SEP of $75,000 to the New Jersey Conservancy for purchase 
of new wetlands); United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 35162, 35162 (1995) (CWA 
defendants required to pay $3,250,000 penalty, to perform two SEPs at cost of $1,000,000, and 
to control future discharges); United States v. City of Akron, 60 Fed. Reg. 31495, 31495 (1995) 
(CWA defendant, a municipality, required to perform three SEPs valued at $3,325,000 and to 
implement plant and sewer system improvements); United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 60 
Fed. Reg. 19773, 19773 (1995) (proposed consent decree which would require CWA defendant 
to pay penalty, to improve rail inspection, and to contribute $100,000 to a fund to be used for 
study on rail defects similar to those involved in two derailments). 
72 Growth Expected in Program to Cut Fines in Swap for Participation in Projects, 16 Chern. 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2278, 2278 (Feb. 19, 1993). 
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as the Toxic Substance Control Act, specifically provide for considera-
tion of SEPs as part of settlement negotiations.73 One statute has gone 
one step further by extending the use of SEPs to the next level of 
environmental protection: The Clean Air Act expressly grants courts 
the authority to impose SEPs as part of their enforcement order.74 
Section 7604(g)(2) of the Clean Air Act provides, in relevant part: "the 
court in any action under this subsection ... shall have discretion to 
order that such civil penalties, in lieu of being deposited in the fund, 
be used for beneficial mitigation projects which are consistent with 
this chapter and enhance the public health or environment."75 
Unfortunately, efforts to introduce similar measures in the CWA 
have been far less successful. In 1993, a CWA re-authorization bill 
which included amendments that would have allowed courts to allo-
cate all or part of a civil penalty towards environmental remediation 
was introduced; this bill was never enacted.76 In 1995, a similar, al-
though somewhat less ambitious bill, proposed amending the CWA to 
permit liable defendants to choose between depositing monetary pen-
alties into the Treasury or allocating the payments towards local 
environmental funds.77 This bill also perished in Congress. As the 
CWA currently stands, no express legitimacy has been accorded to 
SEPs. 
III. SEPs IN THE COURTS 
A. Defining the Parameters of the Current Status 
Although they were not specifically termed "supplemental environ-
mental projects," SEPs were used in various citizen suit settlements 
during the 1980'S.78 The case generally credited with establishing the 
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (1994). ToSCA provides in relevant part: "[EPA may] compro-
mise, modify or remit, with or without conditions, any civil penalty which may be imposed under 
this subsection." [d. 
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (1994). 
75 [d. The maximum amount which courts are permitted to allocate towards mitigation pro-
jects is $100,000. [d. 
76 See Michael Paul Stevens, Comment, Limits on Supplemental Environmental Projects in 
Consent Agreements to Settle Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 757, 784-85 
(1994) (discussing introduction of Senate bill S. 1114, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993». 
77 See S. 1390, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill was entitled "Local Environmental 
Improvement Facilitation Act." The proposed bill would have amended the CWA to permit the 
defendant to elect to pay its penalty (1) to the Treasury or (2) towards community environmental 
projects, not to exceed $500,000. 
78 See JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 4, at 113-62. 
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legitimacy of SEPs is Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, 
Inc.79 In Electronic Controls, the Sierra Club brought a citizen suit 
pursuant to the CWA against the defendant Electronic Controls De-
sign for allegedly discharging pollutants from its manufacturing plant 
into the Molalla River.80 Before the case went to trial, the parties 
agreed to enter a consent judgment, wherein the defendant agreed to 
come into compliance and pay $45,000 to various private environ-
mental organizations to help fund water quality projects in the state.8! 
The United States, through DOJ, objected to the proposed consent 
judgment because the agreement contained no payments to the Treas-
ury.82 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held 
that the consent judgment's payment to third-party groups were civil 
penalties.83 Ruling that the CWA required civil penalties to be paid 
into the Treasury, the court refused to enter the order because the 
agreement improperly diverted money owed to the federal govern-
ment.84 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and entered the agreement.85 The court agreed with the district court 
that the CWA required civil penalties to be deposited into the Treas-
ury; however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the defendant 
had never been found liable, the civil penalty policy concerning the 
disposition of funds did not affect the settlement reached by private 
parties.86 A number of courts have ruled consistently with the position 
articulated by the Electronic Controls court and have allowed parties 
to enter consent decrees which contain SEPs.87 
79 Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990); see 
Stevens, supra note 76, at 760; see generally Jofuku, supra note 26, at 928. 
80 See Electronic Controls, 909 F.2d at 1352. 
81 [d. The consent decree also stipulated that the defendant would reimburse Sierra Club for 
attorney and witness fees, as well as pay additional sums for future violations. [d. 
82 See id. 
83 [d. 
84 See id. 
85 See Electronic Controls, 909 F.2d at 1356. 
86 See id. at 1354-55. 
87 See, e.g., Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu, 149 F.R.D. 614, 617 (D. Haw. 1993); 
Conservation Law Found. of New England v. City of Fall River, CIV.A.87-3067-Z, 1992 WL 
52520, at *8 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 1992); Citizen Suit Settled with $100,000 Penalty, 25 Env't Rep. 
(BN A) 2430 (Apr. 7, 1995) (settlement of Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Reynolds 
Metals Co. (N.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 1995) (settlement wherein $100,000 given to University of 
Washington to replenish salmon stock in Columbia River); $420,000 Penalty Agreed to in New 
York PCB Case, Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 10, 1992, available in WL, BNA-ENV (reporting 
settlement in Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Reynolds Metals Co., No. 88-CV---B40, (D.N.Y. 
Mar. 18, 1992) (settlement providing for $245,000 to state environmental protection agency, 
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Although courts have not contradicted Electronic Controls, several 
courts have declined to expand upon its holding to permit the use of 
SEPs after the imposition of "civil penalties."BS For example, in Public 
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals, Inc., a 1990 case decided close to the time of Electronic 
Controls, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that it could not enter a consent decree which contained a SEP 
providing for the creation of an environmental trust.89 Powell Duffryn 
involved a complaint brought by environmental public interest groups 
against a liquid storage facility for illegally dumping pollutants in 
excess of its permit.90 The district court held that the defendant had 
violated its permit, and ordered the corporation to pay its penalty into 
a trust fund to be used for improving the environment of New Jer-
sey.91 The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of the trust fund, 
concluding that the penalties could not be used for this purpose be-
cause civil penalties had to be deposited into the Treasury.92 
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the trust fund could 
have been created through the court's own equitable jurisdiction when 
ordering injunctive relief.93 At least two other courts have echoed the 
sentiments expressed by the Powell Duffryn court.94 In United States 
v. Roll Coater, Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana stated: "Under the [CWA] , a court may fashion 
injunctive relief requiring a defendant to pay monies to other entities, 
if there is a nexus between the harm and the remedy. But once labeled 
as a civil penalty, the money must be paid to the Treasury."95 Similarly, 
$120,000 to Mohawk Nation, and $55,000 towards environmental projects for alleged violations 
ofCWA). 
88 See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 
F.2d 64, 81---82 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Atlantic States Legal Found., 
Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 743, 754 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Friends of 
the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 780 F. Supp. 95, 101-02 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Antrim 
Mining, Inc. v. Davis, 775 F. Supp. 165, 170 (M.D. Pa. 1991); United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 
21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 1991). 
89 See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 81-82. 
90 See id. at 69. 
91 See id. at 69-70. 
92 See id. at 82. 
93 See id. 
94 See Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 780 F. Supp. 95, 101 (N.D.N.Y. 
1992); United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. 
Ind. Mar. 22, 1991). 
95 Roll Coater, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21077. 
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in Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of New York implicitly 
reasoned that a plaintiff could request a SEP as part of its injunctive 
relief.96 
By contrast, at least two courts have expanded the use of SEPs 
beyond the interpretation set out in Electronic Controls.97 Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center v. Unified Sewerage Agency of Wash-
ington County involved a citizen suit brought against a municipal 
sewer authority for discharging sewage illegally into a local river.98 
After finding the defendant liable, the United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon entered a consent decree that required the 
defendant to pay $100,000 to the state of Oregon to fund the state 
Department of Environmental Quality and $900,000 to an environ-
mental fund to protect the Tualatin River, despite the court's charac-
terization of the $1,000,000 as a penalty.99 Rejecting the government's 
argument that the CWA required the defendant to pay penalties into 
the Treasury, the court stated that using the money in the manner 
proposed by the consent decree was proper because the CW Ns pur-
pose is to improve water quality, not to endow the Treasury.100 Apply-
ing these funds to environmentally beneficial projects, according to 
the court, was therefore consistent with congressional intent.1OI 
Similarly, in United States v. City of San Diego, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California ruled that a 
penalty assessed against the city of San Diego could be applied to 
environmentally beneficial projects.102 Reviewing the penalty provi-
sion of the CWA, the court noted that the statute permits courts to 
consider various issues, including "other matters as justice may re-
quire."103 Construing this language to permit courts to exercise their 
full equitable discretion, the court imposed a penalty of $3,000,000, 
96 Archer Daniels, 780 F. Supp. at 102. 
97 See United States v. City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1256, 1261-62 (S.D. Cal. 
1991); Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington County, 21 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20676, 20677 (D. Or. 1990). 
98 Unified Sewerage, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20677. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. The court also stated that the agreement should be approved because the state 
department of environmental quality played a substantial part in negotiating the consent 
decree, and would serve as almost the exclusive compliance authority for the defendant. See id. 
102 See City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1261-62. 
103 See id. at 1261. 
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which included a payment of $500,000 into the United States Treas-
ury.104 The court ruled that the remaining penalty could be used by 
the city of San Diego to earn credit through a SEP: by enacting 
specific ordinances to help reduce water use and promote water con-
servation in residential dwellings, the city could reduce its penalty by 
$2,500,000.105 The court's order also provided for the contingency of 
non-performance, stating that the remaining penalty would be paid 
into the Treasury if the city failed to pass their ordinances within a 
stipulated time period.106 
B. An Issue Unanswered by the Federal Courts 
While some inconsistencies remain, the courts have settled at least 
a few issues concerning the use of SEPs. As the discussion above 
indicates, most courts have emphasized that the legitimacy of SEPs 
turns on whether the court has imposed civil penalties.107 Courts uni-
formly seem to agree that SEPs may comprise part of a settlement, 
because consent decrees created from such settlements do not impli-
cate civil penalties.108 Further, while a few courts maintain that the 
establishment ofliability requires the imposition of civil penalties, this 
belief clearly is misguided and contrary to established law.109 One issue 
which remains unclear is whether courts may order environmental 
mitigation projects if a case is litigated to conclusion rather than 
settled. A majority of courts, including the Electronic Controls court, 
have stated that the imposition of a "civil penalty" requires the de-
fendant to direct its payment into the Treasury, even if the parties 
104 See id. at 1261-62. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. at 1262. 
107 See supra Section lILA. 
108 See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
109 See Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 780 F. Supp. 95, 102 (N.D.N.Y. 
1992) (liability requires imposition of penalty); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal 
Tool & Stamping Co., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 743, 754 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (same); but see Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987) (stating that in citizen 
suit under CWA, "if the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive relief 
and/or impose civil penalties") (emphasis added); see also Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Hono-
lulu, 149 F.R.D. 614, 617-18 (D. Haw. 1993) (concluding that liability does not require imposition 
of civil penalty, citing Friends ofthe Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 656 F. Supp. 513 (W.D.N.Y.), 
afl'd, 834 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1987) (no civil penalty imposed although liability found»; Michigan 
v. City of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1024 (E.D. Mich. 1980), afl'd, 667 F.2d 1028 (6th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) (same); Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v. Eaton, 506 
F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981) (same). 
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agree to the performance of a SEP.1l0 A few courts have disagreed 
with this rule, primarily because it prevents affected communities 
from obtaining the benefits gained from a CWA action.l11 Motivated 
by their conclusion that the CW Ns purposes should be given proper 
effect, these courts have asserted that the statutory civil penalty 
scheme should be read to allow courts to order SEPs as part of their 
remedial order.1l2 The arguments forwarded by these courts, however, 
are not the only approach to ensure that the CW Ns purposes are met. 
The use of judicial discretion may offer courts an alternative basis for 
imposing SEPs to give effect to the CWNs purposes. Although a few 
courts have alluded to this possibility, none have exercised their dis-
cretion to grant such reliefya The remainder of this Comment ex-
plores the possibility of applying the courts' equitable discretion to 
this purpose. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION IN CWA CASES 
The extent of equitable discretion necessarily depends upon the 
statutory context in which the doctrine is applied.114 Accordingly, the 
following section turns towards the Supreme Court's treatment of 
judicial discretion in connection with the CWA. The Court, in a group 
of decisions rendered during the early 1980's, helped to define the 
general scope of equitable discretion in the context of enforcement.1l5 
While the central holdings in these decisions do not speak directly 
towards the issue of the federal courts' ability to order SEPs, an 
examination of these opinions is helpful nevertheless to determine 
whether the concept of judicially-imposed SEPs comports with the 
Court's interpretation of the CWA. 
110 See, e.g., Electronic Controls, 909 F.2d at 1354; Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. 
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 82 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); 
United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 22, 1991). 
111 See United States v. City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1256, 1261-62 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 1991); Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington 
County, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20676, 20677 (D. Or. July 26, 1990). 
112 See City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1261-62; Unified Sewerage, 21 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20677. 
113 See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 81-82; Archer Daniels, 780 F. Supp. at 101-02; Roll Coater, 
21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21077. 
114 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115 See generally Weinberger, 456 U.S. 305; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
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A. The Reduction of Judicial Discretion 
In the 1980 case City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court 
addressed a nuisance complaint brought by the states of Illinois and 
Michigan against the city of Milwaukee and its metropolitan sewerage 
commissions.lI6 The complaint, which consisted of two supposed vio-
lations, alleged that the defendants' treatment plants were not treat-
ing sewage adequately before discharge, and that the defendants' 
continuing failure to control sewer system overflows resulted in illegal 
discharges into Lake Michigan.ll7 The plaintiffs asserted that the com-
bined sewage from these sources constituted a nuisance because the 
disease-ridden sludge flowing into Illinois waters created a health 
threat for its residents. lIB Finding that a nuisance had been estab-
lished, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois imposed effluent treatment standards to correct the inadequate 
treatment and mandated a timetable to eliminate sewage overflows.lI9 
Both standards were stricter than those required by CWA-issued 
permits.l20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the stricter effluent limitations imposed by the district 
court, but upheld the timetable constructed to eliminate the sewage 
overflows.121 
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals's decision to in-
validate the effluent limitations, but reversed its decision regarding 
the timetable concerning overflows.l22 The Court held that Congress's 
adoption of the CWA amendments precluded the use of federal com-
mon law, including "maxims of equity jurisprudence," at least with 
respect to the plaintiffs' claims.l23 The Court's dicta, however, reflected 
a far broader disapproval of expansive judicial authority.l24 The Court 
116 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 318-20. The Supreme Court originally declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over the initial suit brought by Illinois against the City of Milwaukee, based 
on the rationales that the conflict did not involve two states and because Illinois could have 
sought relief in federal district court. See id. at 308-10. (discussing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91 (1972». After the adoption of the CWA amendments in 1972, however, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to evaluate the impact of the amendments on the city of Milwaukee's 
claim. See id. 
117 See id. at 309. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 311-12. 
120 [d. at 312. 
121 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 312. 
122 See id. at 319-23. 
123 See id. at 317. 
124 See id. at 312-17. The court stated "when Congress addresses a question previously 
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adopted the view that federal common law was only appropriate in 
relatively restricted instances, such as where difficult federal inter-
ests could not be answered by federal statutes or where the absence 
of an applicable statutory standard required its use.l25 The majority 
concluded that the critical question which would determine whether 
a statute had preempted judicial discretion was whether the legisla-
tive scheme had spoken directly to an issue.l26 Because it found that 
Congress had done so regarding effluent limitations and overflows, 
the Court held that the district court retained no authority to issue 
more stringent emissions or overflow standards than those required 
under the permit because Congress already had expressed its intent 
to occupy this area of water pollution control.l27 In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority held that the CWA citizen suit provision did 
not protect federal common law remedies from displacement by other 
provisions of the Act.l28 
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, 
expressed concern that the majority opinion would be interpreted as 
implying a presumptive displacement of federal common law when 
legislation was adopted to address a particular issue.l29 Rather, the 
dissent insisted that federal common law remains to "fill the intersti-
ces of a pervasively federal framework" absent a specific declaration 
from Congress that the exercise of such power was to be precluded.l30 
The dissent not only failed to find any such declaration, but also 
concluded that Congress specifically intended to protect all federal 
common law in the CWNs "savings clause."l3l Justice Blackmun also 
governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of 
lawmaking by federal courts disappears." See id. at 314. 
125 See id. at 313-14. 
126 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314--15. 
127 See id. at 332. 
128 See id. at 328-29. 
129 See id. 333-34, 338-39 n.S (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
130 See id. at 336. 
131 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 339 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994) (stating, in relevant 
part: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute err comnwn law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or 
linlitation or to seek any other relief') (emphasis in original». Justice Blackmun criticized the 
majority's glib explanation dismissing this explicit preservation of federal common law reme-
dies. He refused to accept the contorted logic offered by the majority which suggested that 
while Congress expressly preserved federal common law remedies under its citizen suit provi-
sion, it simultaneously and implicitly intended to displace such remedies through the sheer 
comprehensiveness of the statute as a whole. See id. at 342. See also Daniel Farber, Equitable 
Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PI'rI'. L. REV. 513, 519-20 
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found the majority's interpretation of the legislative history unper-
suasive, and offered his own analysis of legislative history which 
reflected a concern for preserving the full remedies under federal 
common law.l32 
In the same year, the Supreme Court narrowed the boundaries of 
judicial discretion even further in Middlesex County Sewerage Author-
ity v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.l33 In National Sea Clammers, 
an association of shellfishermen brought suit against various govern-
ment entities and officials for discharging sewage, sludge, and other 
waste into the New York Harbor and Hudson River.l34 The plaintiffs 
sought damages, injunctive relief and declaratory relief under the 
CWA as well as a host of other legal theories. 1M The United States 
District Court of New Jersey dismissed the CWA complaint because 
the plaintiffs had failed to provide timely notice to EPA, the State and 
all of the alleged violators.l36 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs' non-compli-
ance with the CW Pis notice requirements did not preclude recovery.137 
Adopting in essence the argument of Justice Blackmun in City of 
Milwaukee, the Court of Appeals ruled that the CWPis citizen suit 
"savings clause" in § 1365(e) preserved the plaintiffs' right to seek 
relief under the statute despite the failure to follow administrative 
procedure.138 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's approval of an 
implied CWA cause of action.139 Applying reasoning similar to that 
used in City of Milwaukee, the Court determined that Congress in-
tended to regulate water pollution completely through its promulga-
tion of a comprehensive enforcement structure in the CWA amend-
ments.140 In addition, the Court asserted once again that the CW Pis 
"saving clause" provision did not protect judicial discretion from the 
(1984) (asserting agreement with Justice Blackmun's assessment that Congress intended to 
preserve federal common law remedies). 
132 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 341-45. 
133 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 
(1981). 
134 See id. at 4-5. 
135 See id. at 5 n.6. The plaintiffs also filed complaints under the Marine Protection, Research, 
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), federal common law, the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899, and state statutes. Id. 
136 See id. at 6. 
137 See id. at 8-9. 
138 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 8-9. 
139 See id. at 15. 
140 See id. at 13-15. 
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rest of the CWA itself.141 Consequently, the Court concluded that the 
avenues of enforcement granted to citizens under the CWA scheme 
should be the exclusive means for relief, and therefore prohibited 
courts from crafting their own implied causes of action.l42 
B. The Re-emergence of Equitable Discretion 
The opportunity to address the scope of judicial discretion under 
the CWA arose again one year later in Weinberger v. Romero-Bar-
celo.l43 In Weinberger, however, the Supreme Court departed from the 
trend it had been building from the previous year. l44 Weinberger con-
cerned a complaint brought by the governor of Puerto Rico and the 
island's residents to enjoin the Navy from practicing aerial operations 
off the coast of the island.l45 The plaintiffs argued that the Navy had 
violated the CWA by discharging bombs into the waters surrounding 
the island without a CWA permit.l46 The United States District Court 
of Puerto Rico found the Navy had violated the Act, ordered it to 
apply for a permit, but refused to enjoin its training activities.147 
Balancing the equities, the court concluded that the negligible harm 
caused by the Navy's activities was far outweighed by the importance 
of the military training for the purposes of national security.l48 Relying 
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill,149 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
cluded that the district court did not possess any discretion to deter-
mine whether an injunction should issue.l50 The Court of Appeals 
therefore vacated and remanded the district court decision, instruct-
ing the lower court to enjoin further activities until the Navy obtained 
a permit.151 
141 See id. at 15-16. 
142 See id. at 15. 
142 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
144 See id. at 320. 
145 See id. at 307. 
146 See id. The complaint also alleged violations of several other environmental statutes. The 
district court found the Navy to be in violation ofNEPA as well as CWA. [d. at 307 n.1, 308 n.2. 
147 See id. at 308-10. 
148 See Weinberger,456 U.S. at 309-10. 
149 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Tennessee Valley Authority, the 
Supreme Court held that a court could not engage in a balancing of equities to determine 
whether an injunction should be issued, but was required to provide injunctive relief upon 
demonstration of a violation of the Endangered Species Act. See id. at 194. 
150 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 310-11. 
151 See id. 
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The Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision with a concurrence 
from Justice Powell, reversed the First Circuit and held that the 
district court's decision to refuse an injunction was within its equita-
ble discretion.152 The Court began by reviewing the extensive support 
previously accorded judicial equitable discretion.l53 Reaffirming these 
previous opinions, the Court stated: "Unless a statute in so many 
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied."lM In what appeared to be a reversal of its 
previous interpretation of the CWA, the Court then proceeded to 
demonstrate that the statutory scheme as a whole encouraged the use 
of judicial discretion.l55 The majority distinguished its previous deci-
sion in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill by concluding that Con-
gress had intended strict obedience to the Endangered Species Act.156 
The CW Ns purposes and language, by contrast, were substantially 
different because its statutory scheme provided many methods of 
enforcement which could achieve the objectives of the Act.157 The 
Court stressed that courts, who are provided with these various 
mechanisms of enforcement, should be most concerned with fulfilling 
the CW Ns central goal of restoring and maintaining the integrity of 
the Nation's waters rather than satisfying isolated specific require-
ments under the statutory scheme.l58 Accordingly, the Court found 
that the First Circuit had construed the issue improperly when it 
reversed the district court's refusal to issue an injunction.159 
Recognizing the apparent inconsistency between Weinberger and 
City of Milwaukee and National Sea Clammers, the majority distin-
guished those previous decisions by reasoning that while the scheme 
on the whole envisioned expansion of equitable discretion, Congress 
contemplated establishing absolute statutory standards to preclude 
judicial discretion in certain areas.160 The Court maintained, however, 
that Congress did not intend for the CWA "to abolish the courts' 
equitable discretion in ordering remedies."161 
152 See id. at 320. 
153 See id. at 311-13. 
154 Id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946». 
155 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 314-18. 
166 See id. at 313-14. 
167 See id. at 314. 
168 See id. 
159 See id. at 320. 
160 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 316-17 n.ll. 
161 See id. 
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The lone dissenter, Justice Stevens, criticized the majority's read-
ing of the statute for providing free reign to courts to employ judicial 
discretion and paying "mere lipservice" to the statutory goals de-
clared by Congress.162 He called attention to previous Court decisions 
which had confined the use of judicial discretion more rigidly than the 
majority's interpretation in this instance.163 Justice Stevens noted, for 
example, the majority's clear departure from City of Milwaukee, argu-
ing that there was no difference in equitable discretion between al-
lowing courts to recognize federal common law nuisance and permit-
ting courts to decide whether to obey statutory standards.l64 Similarly, 
he contended that the statutory mandate in Weinberger offered no 
meaningful distinction from Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill which 
should have allowed the lower court to ignore the rule requiring strict 
adherence to the statutory standard provided by Congress.165 
The Supreme Court's vacillating interpretations have left some 
confusion in the lower courts.166 The inconsistency displayed by the 
Court has caused some commentators to speculate openly about the 
extent to which the political and social agendas of the majority have 
dictated the Court's environmental decisions.167 Although this confu-
sion undoubtedly extends to the realm of water pollution, the influence 
of Weinberger itself does not appear to be in question, and is routinely 
acknowledged by commentators.l68 Indeed, despite Justice Stevens' 
forceful dissent, the Supreme Court subsequently demonstrated the 
162 See id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also accused the majority of 
improperly misconstruing the Court of Appeals's opinion for the purpose of using it as a 
springboard for an unnecessary discussion on equitable discretion in federal courts. See id. at 325. 
163 See id. at 328-30. 
164 See id. at 330-3l. 
165 See Weinberger, 456 U.S at 331-35. 
166 See generally Jason David Fregeau, Comment, Statutes and Judicial Discretion: Against 
the Law . .. Sort of, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501 (1991) (discussing disparate interpreta-
tions of Supreme Court's opinions explicating judicial discretion and their application in lower 
courts). 
167 See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CLEAN AIR AND WATER, § 4.5(B), 
67, 89-92 (2d. ed. 1986); see generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial 
Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Co'urt's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 343 (1989) (arguing that Supreme Court's recent environmental decisions reflect pro-de-
velopment/anti-environment stance of Court's majority). 
168 See, e.g., J. Wallace Malley, Jr. & Jeffrey M. Silverstein, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Federal Condemnation: A Call for Recognition of a Federal Common Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 501, 
529 n.170 (1991) (citing Weinberger for rule that "Clean Water Act [is] not intended to abolish 
[the] courts' equitable discretion to order remedies"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values 
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1989) (citing Weinberger in support 
of assertion that "the [Supreme Court] may also presume that Congress does not intend to strip 
federal courts of their inherent powers, especially their power to fashion creative relief in 
equity"). 
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dominance of Weinberger's interpretation of the CWA in the non-CWA 
case Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska.169 Amoco 
involved a complaint brought by two Alaskan Native villages against 
the Secretary of the Interior for failing to comply with the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).170 ANILCA 
required the Secretary to evaluate the potential environmental im-
pacts of allowing certain uses for federal land, to seek alternatives to 
eliminate such effects, and to provide procedural safeguards which 
would assure proper notice, hearing, and comment to relevant par-
ties.17l The United States District Court of Alaska found that the 
Secretary had failed to comply with ANILCA at the time that it 
issued leases to private companies for oil exploration, but refused to 
issue an injunction for the violation.172 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that injunctive relief 
was the proper remedy for the Secretary's failure to assess environ-
mental impact.173 
The Supreme Court, analogizing the case to Weinberger, reversed 
the Court of Appeals's decision.174 Applying the Weinberger standard, 
the Court stated that ANILCA, like the CW A, did not confine the 
lower court's discretion because "there is no clear indication ... that 
Congress intended to deny federal district courts their traditional 
equitable discretion in enforcing the provision, nor are we compelled 
to infer such a limitation."175 The Court also emphasized the impor-
tance which Weinberger attributed to the underlying substantive pol-
icy of the statute, rather than specific statutory procedures, as the 
highest guiding principle for the courts' application of judicial discre-
tion.176 The majority's deliberate effort to reaffirm Weinberger was 
particularly telling, given the Court's ability to dispose of the case 
without engaging in a Weinberger analysis.177 
169 See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 541-43 (1987). 
170 See id. at 539. 
171 [d. at 535 n.2 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
172 See id. at 539-40. The district court, balancing the equities, concluded that the licensed 
exploration would not cause significant harm to subsistence resources and that strong public 
interest supported immediate oil exploration. In addition, the court reasoned that the Secretary 
retained authority to address any harm which might arise. See id. 
173 See id. at 539-40. 
174 See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 541-45. 
175 See id. at 544. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 546-47. As Justice Stevens astutely observed, since the Supreme Court deter-
mined that ANILCA did not apply to the lands specified in the lease, there was no need to enter 
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C. The Pro-plaintiff Application of Weinberger 
Commentators have regarded Weinberger appropriately as an anti-
environment decision.178 A few lower courts, however, have taken the 
opportunity presented by Weinberger to employ its holding for the 
purpose of protecting pro-plaintiff interests.179 For example, in United 
States v. Metropolitan District Commission, a case decided nearly a 
decade after Weinberger, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit upheld a district court's use of broad equitable discretion 
in a CWA violation. ISO In Metropolitan District Commission, the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the 
state of Massachusetts violated the CWA by illegally discharging 
sewage into Boston Harbor.181 The parties and the district court de-
veloped a fifteen year compliance plan which required the Common-
wealth to construct a multi-billion dollar sewage treatment system.182 
A critical part of the plan called for the district commission's procure-
ment of a suitable landfill to contain sludge produced by the treatment 
process.l83 
Despite a five-year search, state officials failed to obtain a suitable 
landfill site, largely due to resistance from local legislative officials. l84 
The district court, which had allowed the discharges to continue 
throughout this time, delivered an ultimatum that threatened to en-
join further sewage discharges unless the state allowed for the trans-
fer of an adequate landfill site.185 When the defendant failed to con-
vince the district court to modify its order, it appealed.186 Then-Chief 
Judge Breyer, writing for the Court of Appeals, upheld the district 
court's order against the Commonwealth.187 Because the district court 
had remained within the broad authority granted by Weinberger "to 
the discussion of the standard established in Weinberger. See id. at 555-56 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part). 
178 See Farber, supra note 131, at 522 (noting that "the common reading of Weinberger seems 
to be that the Court licensed the Navy to violate the Clean Water Act"). 
179 See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 930 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 1991); Cia. 
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 416--17 (1st Cir. 1985); Alaska Ctr. 
for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1380-81 (W.D. Wash. 1992). 
180 See Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 930 F.2d at 135. 
181 See id. at 133. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. at 134. 
184 See id. 
185 See Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 930 F.2d at 134. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 135. 
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choose appropriate remedies for [a] violation of the Clean Water Act," 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court had not acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously.l88 
In Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, several citizen 
groups brought suit to compel EPA to perform its statutory duty of 
establishing water quality standards under the CWA.189 Under the 
CWA, EPA acquires a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate pollution 
limits if a state's submissions for applicable standards are inadequate, 
or if the state fails to perform its duties.l90 The plaintiffs complained 
that EPA did not approve Alaska's submissions, but also failed to 
adopt its own standards as well, thus delaying the promulgation of 
any enforceable water pollution standard for over a decade.191 The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
therefore granted the plaintiffs' motion and ordered EPA to develop 
a reasonable schedule with Alaska for the adoption of pollution limi-
tations.192 At the request of the citizen-plaintiffs, the court also or-
dered EPA to prepare ongoing reports on ambient water quality 
monitoring to provide some assurance that EPA would develop the 
standards properly.193 Although the court agreed with EPA that it 
lacked the authority to impose this last requirement under the CW Ns 
citizen suit provision, it nevertheless concluded that it could order the 
Agency to perform this task because it had ''broad discretion in fash-
ioning appropriate injunctive relief" under Weinberger. l94 
Weinberger's influence even has extended to non-environmental 
cases.195 In Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., a 
gasoline vendor brought an antitrust claim against a private corpora-
tion, alleging that the defendant had illegally acquired a business in 
violation of the Clayton Act.l96 The plaintiff's request seeking a dives-
titure of the assets was denied by the United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico, which held that such a request could 
not be brought by private plaintiffs under the Clayton Act.l97 The 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.198 Applying the hold-
188 [d. at 136. 
189 See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (W.D. Wash. 1992). 
190 See id. 
191 See id. at 1376--78. 
192 See id. at 1378-80. 
193 See id. at 1380. 
194 See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't, 796 F. Supp. at 1380. 
195 See Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 416--17 (1st Cir. 1985). 
196 See id. at 406--07. 
197 See id. at 406. 
198 See id. at 416--17. 
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ing of Weinberger, it found that the district court's broad equitable 
authority potentially encompassed the power to grant the remedy 
sought by the private plaintiff, and therefore remanded the case to 
the lower court for reconsideration.199 
V. TAILORING THE REMEDY TO REQUIRE SEPs 
As the courts themselves have noted, the goal of the CWA is to 
protect and improve the Nation's waters, not to endow the federal 
government.2OO Accordingly, both citizen-plaintiffs and government 
agencies have turned to SEPs to secure the benefits obtained from 
CWA actions for the local environments directly affected by viola-
tions.201 Although the government has resisted their use in citizen 
suits, many courts have established that, at least insofar as settle-
ments are concerned, SEPs are permissible under the CWA.202 The 
justification for SEPs, however, does not change when parties fail to 
resolve their disputes by settlement. In order to fulfill the purposes 
of the CWA, courts therefore should consider imposing SEPs even 
when settlements do not occur. The court's equitable power arguably 
provides the method by which appropriate environmental relief can 
be achieved.203 
As an initial consideration, courts could attempt to interpret the 
CWNs language as authorizing the diversion of civil penalties towards 
SEPS.204 In City of San Diego, for example, the district court imposed 
a civil penalty of $3,000,000 on San Diego, but offered the defendant 
an option to direct $2,500,000 of the sum towards a SEp'205 The court 
found that it could allocate the penalties in this manner because 
Congress had preserved the courts' ability to exert their equitable 
power in this context.206 Similarly, in Unified Sewerage, the district 
court concluded that the defendant's $1,000,000 payment constituted 
a civil penalty, but held that the congressional purposes behind the 
CWA permitted the court to use the penalties to fund environmental 
199 See id. 
200 See Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington County, 21 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20676, 20677 (D. Or. July 26, 1990). 
201 See supra note 70; JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 4, at 113-62. 
202 See supra Section III. 
203 See United States v. City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1256, 1261-S2 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 1991); Unified Sewerage, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20677. 
204 See id. 
205 See City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1261-S2. 
206 See id. at 1261. 
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projects in the state of Oregon.207 Unfortunately, while the intentions 
of both courts may have been admirable, the conclusions they reached 
were weakened by the fact that the judges diverted the defendants' 
payments towards mitigation projects despite conceding that such 
payments constituted civil penalties.208 The courts thereby contra-
dicted the conclusion reached not only by the majority of other lower 
courts, but also the Supreme COurt.209 
A more defensible approach would be to characterize the imposition 
of SEPs in terms of injunctive relief granted under the court's broad 
equitable discretion.210 By adopting this approach, courts and pro-en-
vironment plaintiffs could avoid the legal complications associated 
with the proper disposition of "civil penalties." Indeed, this approach 
was suggested by the very same courts that rejected using civil 
penalties for the purpose of funding SEPs; in those instances, the 
courts made a point to acknowledge that the plaintiffs could have 
achieved their objectives by appealing to the court's equitable author-
ity to impose a SEP.2l1 As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in Powell Duffryn stated: 
[The plaintiff] nonetheless argues that the district court could 
have created this trust fund through its equitable jurisdiction 
when ordering injunctive relief. This is true and we do not reject 
PIRG's argument that in a Clean Water Act case, a court may 
fashion injunctive relief requiring a defendant to pay moneys into 
a remedial fund .... [B]ut here, once the court labeled the money 
as civil penalties it could only be paid into the Treasury.212 
2Q7 See Unified Sewerage, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20677. 
208 See City of San Diego, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1261--U2; Unified Sewage, 21 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20677. 
209 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987) 
(''the court may order injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States 
Treasury); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 
n.25 (1981) ("Under the [CWA], civil penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered 
by the court"); Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 81 (3d Cir. 1990), ceTt. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic 
Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990). 
210 See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 82; Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
780 F. Supp. 95, 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. Ind. 1991). 
211 See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 82; Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
780 F. Supp. 95,101 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 21073, 21077 (S.D. Ind. 1991). 
212 Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 82. 
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In other words, had the case been framed in terms of injunctive 
relief rather than as a civil penalty, the Powell Duffryn court would 
have deemed itself free to divert the defendant's money towards a 
SEP. Instead, the Court of Appeals found itself bound to order the 
defendant to deposit the money into the Treasury because the district 
court had established the payment previously as a "civil penalty."213 
Although the Supreme Court's assessment of judicial discretion 
may seem initially unclear or unrelated to this issue, a closer exami-
nation of its more recent interpretations of the CWA reveals its 
current implicit support for the position articulated above. City of 
Milwaukee raised the issue of a district court's discretionary author-
ity to impose federal common law standards that were more rigid than 
those required by the CWA.214 In National Sea Clammers, the central 
inquiry involved the lower court's authority to permit the plaintiffs to 
maintain their complaint despite their failure to observe statutory 
procedural requirements.215 In both instances, the Court concluded 
that the exercise of judicial discretion was prohibited because Con-
gress had already furnished extensive statutory standards to govern 
the issues in dispute.216 According to the Supreme Court, the CWA 
amendments of 1972 reflected Congress's intent to establish a "com-
prehensive regulatory program" to address water pollution, thus leaving 
no room for courts to craft either stricter common law standards for 
discharging waste water or implied causes of action.217 
Given the language of the Court in City of Milwaukee and National 
Sea Clammers, the disfavor shown towards equitable discretion eas-
ily could have been interpreted to extend to the Clean Water Act as 
a whole. The Court's ensuing decision in Weinberger, however, elimi-
nated this possibility.218 While the Court did not overturn City of 
Milwaukee and National Sea Clammers, the Weinberger decision 
limited both decisions to their particular circumstances by recogniz-
ing the tremendous equitable discretion enjoyed by courts under the 
CWA.219 Indeed, the Court's expansive reading of judicial discretion 
in Weinberger seemed to imply that courts would be foreclosed from 
213 See id. 
214 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1981). 
216 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,8-9 
(1981). 
216 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15; City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 319-20. 
217 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-15; City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317-19. 
218 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313-16 (1982). 
219 See id. at 316 n.ll. 
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exercising their equitable authority only if Congress made its intent 
to provide the exclusive means of regulation painfully clear: 
[The] comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be 
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary 
and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in eq-
uity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and 
applied.220 
Weinberger, in essence, gave life to the rejected position asserted by 
Justice Blackmun's dissent in City of Milwaukee.221 While the Court's 
re-visitation of City of Milwaukee and National Sea Clammers thus 
reaffirmed the continuing prohibition against creating implied causes 
of action or displacing statutory permit standards, Weinberger freed 
the courts to exercise broad judicial discretion within other "intersti-
ces of a pervasively federal framework" unless an unavoidable inter-
pretation of Congressional intent compels the removal of such power.222 
The preceding discussion indicates that although the Court has yet 
to directly address the precise scope of the courts' power to shape 
appropriate relief, its sweeping interpretation of judicial discretion 
strongly suggests that courts possess the authority to impose SEPs.223 
This position is bolstered by Weinberger's explicit observation that 
Congress intended to preserve the courts' equitable authority to or-
der appropriate remedies under the CWA, and its proclamation that 
"relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessa-
tion.''224 Furthermore, although Weinberger and Amoco employed equi-
table discretion for the purpose of denying environmental relief, there 
is no reason why the same judicial power could not be wielded to 
provide positive environmental benefits for communities injured by 
CWA violations. Indeed, cases such as Metropolitan District Commis-
sion, Alaska Center for the Environment, and Petrolera Caribe dem-
onstrate that courts have not hesitated to seize upon the equitable 
220 [d. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)) (emphasis 
added). 
221 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 336 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun 
argued, "The fact that Congress in 1972 once again addressed the complicated and difficult 
problem of purifying our Nation's waters should not be taken as presumptive evidence, let alone 
conclusive proof, that Congress meant to foreclose pre-existing approaches ... [a] reviewing 
court is obligated to look not only to the magnitude of the legislative action but also with some 
care to the evidence of specific congressional intent." [d. at 338-39 (emphasis added). 
222 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313; City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 335. 
223 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313. 
224 See id. at 316 n.ll, 320 (emphasis added). 
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authority recognized in Weinberger to grant plaintiffs relief where 
such remedies were not expressly indicated by statute.225 Because the 
judicial imposition of a SEP is distinguishable from judicial attempts 
to enforce a federal common law nuisance action or to grant an implied 
cause of action, the prohibitions established in City of Milwaukee and 
National Sea Clammers would not bar such judicial activism.226 
Assuming that this expansive view of equitable discretion is cor-
rect, courts must then face the difficult task of determining how to 
apply their power judiciously. As Justice Stevens averred in his dis-
sent of Weinberger, "the Court's opinion grants an open-ended license 
to federal judges to carve gaping holes in a reticulated statutory 
scheme."227 The potential abuses of judicial discretion, however, can 
be curtailed if courts strictly adhere to some practical principles. As 
a baseline consideration, courts should bear in mind that the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the CWA requires courts, in shaping injunc-
tive relief, to maintain the statutory goals as their highest guiding 
principle rather than the particular mechanical requirements of a 
statutory scheme.228 This command provides a threshold constraint, 
but admittedly remains generalized because judges must retain broad 
flexibility to tailor the SEP to the situation at hand.229 In addition, 
injunctive relief should be designed to return the injured party to its 
entitled position, rather than to punish violators, so that the court 
may remain consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
CWA:l:JO In terms of cost, therefore, the imposition of any SEP should 
225 See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 930 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 1991); Cia. 
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1985); Alaska Ctr. 
for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1380-81 (W.D. Wash. 1992). 
226 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 
(1981); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 319-20. Both decisions precluded the possibility of 
permitting plaintiffs to pursue certain causes of action which had been supplanted by the CWA; 
by contrast, the application of equity in the context of SEPs would address the specific form 
relief would assume after a court decides to grant relief. No "necessary and inescapable" 
language in the CWA mandates that equity be excluded in the latter situation. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(a) (1994). 
227 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
228 See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987); Weinber-
ger, 456 U.S. at 314. 
229 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) 
("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power ... to mold each decree to the necessi-
ties of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it"». 
230 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320 ("[TJhe FWPCA permits the district court to order that 
relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include, 
but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation"). Given the Court's unequivocal command 
to emphasize the CWNs statutory purpose as the dominant guiding principle for judicial discre-
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attempt to rival, rather than exceed, any theoretical civil penalties 
which would otherwise be imposed were injunctive relief not granted.231 
EP A:s 1995 SEP Policy would provide valuable guidance to judges 
who engage in the difficult task of crafting environmental remedial 
projects.232 While the 1995 SEP Policy would not be controlling, as at 
least one court has concluded,233 it would offer a rational structure 
which could assist courts in determining the sufficiency of a pro-
posed project. Courts would benefit through the experience of observ-
ing projects which are developed under an elaborate federal agency 
scheme.234 Over time, judges undoubtedly would acquire sufficient 
knowledge and expertise to enable them to forge well-conceived SEPs 
with the assistance of interested parties. To facilitate the design and 
administration of the SEP, courts could even consider spending part 
of the defendants' payment to retain an independent third party to 
help them manage established projects.235 
Incorporating these precautions into decision-making would allow 
courts to silence much of the criticism which the government has 
raised against SEPS.236 The creation of SEPs through judicial discre-
tion would not offend federal laws designed to prevent misappropria-
tion of funds because SEPs would be a form of injunctive relief rather 
than a misuse of civil penalties.237 Additionally, the court or a court-
appointed entity's supervision over the construction of SEPs would 
tion, "compliance with the Act" can be interpreted to encompass any activity which would fulfill 
the CWNs purpose of "[restoring] and [maintaining] the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation's waters." See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
231 To promote uniformity and consistency, courts could calculate theoretical civil penalties, 
then apply this amount to the SEP it decides to impose. 
232 See supra Sections ILA-B. 
233 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Simco Leather Corp., 755 F. Supp. 59, 61 
(N.D.N.Y. 1991). 
234 See supra Section II.A. The 1995 SEP Policy would be helpful in areas such as defining a 
sufficient nexus, conforming the project to an appropriate category of environmental relief, or 
calculating the amount of mitigation for acceptance of a SEP. See 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 
5, at 35614-16. 
235 Contracting an independent third party to manage the SEP would also resolve the unde-
sired effect that polluters will reap the public goodwill from performing an environmentally 
positive act which is in fact a penalty for violating the law. Cf DOJ Statement, supra note 46, 
at 61-62 (expressing concern that guilty parties would enjoy public relations benefits from 
performance of SEP). 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 46-52, 55-57. 
237 The CWA regards injunctive relief and civil penalties as two separate forms of relief. See 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994) (stating that the EPA is authorized to "commence a civil action for 
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction") (emphasis added). See also 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994) (separate provision for civil penalties under enforcement scheme); cf 
DOJ Statement, supra note 46, at 61 (expressing DOJ's concern that SEPs would circumvent 
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ease concerns of possible collusive or abusive agreements.238 Finally, 
by equating the cost of a SEP to the theoretical civil penalties which 
would otherwise be imposed in its place, a court would not only 
maintain the same deterrent effect of penalties, but also could ensure 
the same consistency and predictability as more traditional forms of 
enforcement.239 To be sure, certain problems, such as the issue of 
practical implementation, may present valid concerns weighing against 
judicially-mandated SEPs.240 An increase in SEPs is certain to cause 
a corresponding increase in judicial administrative burden. Possible 
resistance to SEPs, however, might be reduced substantially after 
polluters have the opportunity to evaluate the relative advantages of 
dutifully complying with SEPs.241 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has stated, "environmental injury, by its na-
ture, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is 
often permanent ... i.e., irreparable."242 It is time for the legislature 
to recognize that ordering cessation of violations and payment of civil 
penalties is insufficient by itself. Unfortunately, Congress persists in 
withholding the explicit statutory authority necessary to fulfill the 
national goals of water protection it previously declared in the CWA. 
Because this legislative inertia continues to dominate, the need for 
courts to exert their equitable power in order to give effect to the 
goals of the CWA remains strong. SEPs must be redefined to encom-
pass not only mitigation projects which are produced out of settle-
ments, but also mandatory projects which are imposed by the courts. 
The authority for courts to perform this task arguably has been 
recognized under federal law. While the motivation behind the Su-
preme Court's most recent re-assessment of judicial discretion under 
the CWA may have reflected nothing more than a desire to continue 
its promotion of a pro-government agenda, the Court must accept the 
possibility that its interpretation might be converted to environmental 
federal appropriations process); Kaschak, supra note 15, at 471 (discussing GAO's concern about 
violation of Miscellaneous Receipts Act). 
238 Cf Mann, supra note 42, at 193 (referring to statement of Sen. Chafee)). 
239 Cf DOJ Statement, supra note 46, at 61-62 (objecting that SEPs would reduce deterrence 
of violations, and would be difficult to apply due to inconsistency and unpredictability of each 
individual project). 
240 See id. at 21-22. 
241 See Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 4. 
242 See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). 
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causes. Rather than conceding that this interpretation reflects a set-
back to environmental protection, both citizens and courts could con-
sider employing Weinberger's broad command to create a new method 
to bestow proper relief for proven violations of our federal water 
pollution laws. 
